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This study examines whether nonaudit services provided by an auditor compromise audit quality. We extend the prior literature by using actual audit hours by rank, instead of surveys, compi...
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This study examines whether nonaudit services provided by an auditor compromise audit quality. We extend the prior literature by using actual audit hours by rank, instead of surveys, compiled from the internal data of a Big 4 accounting firm in Korea. Specifically, we investigate whether total audit hours are affected by the nature and level of nonaudit services, controlling for other factors known to influence audit efforts. Nonaudit services are classified into tax filing services and other services. We also examine whether the auditor rank has any significant impact on the relation between nonaudit services and audit hours.
We find that auditors spend more hours on audit as nonaudit service fees or hours increase, contradicting the speculation that nonaudit services may lower audit quality. Surprisingly, this trend was more prominent among high rank auditors. These results are consistent with multiple explanations. Firms that purchase more nonaudit services could be more complex to audit. Alternatively, auditors may take more precautionary measures against engagements that have potentially high audit risk of litigation due to the lack of independence-in-appearance. Although this study provides a direct evidence on auditor inputs, its sample size limits the external validity of the results.
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