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Many changes occurred in human resource management practices in Korean firms since the 1997 foreign currency crisis. At the heart of these changes is the performance-based human resource m...
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Many changes occurred in human resource management practices in Korean firms since the 1997 foreign currency crisis. At the heart of these changes is the performance-based human resource management (PBHRM). Contrary to traditional seniority based HRM, PBHRM is the HR practices and system that focus on individual and/or group performance in evaluation and compensation. This paper has two research purposes. First, what were the most important factors in the rapid diffusion of PBHRM in Korea since the 1997 crisis? Second, is PBHRM effective in improving firm performance? Along with these questions, eight hypotheses were proposed, on the basis of organizational theories and HR literature.
1-1. Top 30 Chaebol-affiliated firms will show higher adoption rate of PBHRM than other firms.
1-2. If CEO of the firm has had business school education from Western countries, the firm is more likely to adopt PBHRM.
1-3. Firms with HR executives are more likely to adopt PBHRM than those without HR executives.
1-4. Firms with differentiation strategy are more likely to adopt PBHRM than those with cost leadership strategy.
2-1. Adoption of Yeonbong-je (Korean style merit pay system) will have an impact on the firm performance.
2-2. Adoption of group performance-based compensation system will be positively related to firm performance.
2-3. Adoption of MBO will be positively related to firm performance.
2-4. Adoption of PBHRM practices simultaneously is more likely to improve firm performance
than individual adoption of PBHRM practices.
To test our hypotheses, we used several different databases. First, we used two surveys completed by HR managers and strategy managers from 271 publicly traded Korean firms in 1998. We also used archival data from Korean Stock Exchange, which contained information about CEOs. Finally we used KIS-FAS financial information to obtain data on financial performance of firms.
Findings pertaining to the adoption of PHHRM are as follows. Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2 were not rejected at the statistically significant level. I -3 and 1-4 were, however, rejected, showing that many Korean firms adopted PBHRM not as a strategic choice, but under an institutional pressure. Confrontational industrial relations and collective culture were negatively related to the adoption of PHHRM. Existence of labor union was also negatively related to group performance-based compensations, however, not to Yeonbong-je or MBO.
Findings as to firm performance are as follow. Hypotheses 2-1 and 2-2 were not rejected at the statistically significant level. Yet hypotheses 2-3 had to be rejected. When we measured the firm performance on the basis of the perception of strategy managers, MBO was the most effective tool. On the contrary, when we measured the firm performance as 5-year average value added per employee, results were slightly different from the former. While firms with Yeonbong-je had 28,000 US dollars more than firms with no Yeonbong-je, firms with MBO had 15,000 US dollars more than firms with no MBO. Interestingly, firms with both Yeonbong-je and MBO simultaneously had 55,000 US dollars than firms with neither Yeonbong-je nor MBO. Thus, hypothesis 2-4 were partially supported. The paper discusses theoretical and practical implications and limitations of the study.
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ABSTRACT