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In the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, Korean corporations have tried to improve transparency by making a better governance structure. In spite of the government¡¯s lead to reform t...
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In the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, Korean corporations have tried to improve transparency by making a better governance structure. In spite of the government¡¯s lead to reform the regimes and each corporations¡¯ endeavor to make a better governance system, the results have not turned out the way that was intended. Large social costs ensued and stakeholders faced heavy losses. Even though a few prior empirical researches attempted to analyze the relation between reformed governance structures and their effectiveness, the results were not promising.
This paper investigates the effects of reformed governance structures looking from a different viewpoint. It focuses on how outside experts judge each firm¡¯s efforts on governance structure and how much they reflect their judgements on firms when it comes to decision-making. In this paper, we observe insurance companies in particular as one example of outside experts. Therefore, their decision-making will determine the Directors¡¯ and Officers¡¯ Premiums (D&O Premiums) in the way they can maximize their profits. We empirically examine the relationship between governance structures and insurance premiums using data on Korean manufacturing firms. The sample period runs from 2000 to 2003. Insurance companies are one of various specialist groups which evaluate the risk of firms and award a grade to each one of them. In the procedure of the assessment, they have an incentive to consider a firm¡¯s governance quality. Because firms having good governance structures are less exposed to litigation risks, an insurer could mark up low insurance premiums(D&O premiums) to them. Therefore insurance premiums reflect firms¡¯ business risks and governance quality. Consequently, by controlling business risks that firms are facing, we examine whether governance quality is used by insurers.
We find in this paper that there is a significant negative relationship between D&O insurance premiums and governance quality, which means firms with good corporate governance pay low insurance premiums (managerial ownership, foreign investors ownership and establishment of audit committee are used as a proxy of governance quality).
The overall results suggest that outside specialist groups such as insurance companies seem to use the information of each firm¡¯s corporate governance structures. It also provides evidence that firms which have good governance structures could lessen their potential litigation risks.
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REFERENCES
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