외환위기 이후 불투명한 경영관행을 개선하고 회계투명성을 높이기 위한 정부의 제도개선노력과 효율적인 기업지배구조 장치 마련을 위한 국내기업들의 노력들이 함께 반영되어 만들어진 기업지배구조에 대한 정보를 기업외부에서 어떻게 평가하고 인식하고 있는가는 매우 중요한 문제이다.
  이에 본 연구는 기업지배구조에 대한 정보효과를 기존연구들과 달리, 외부 전문가의 시각에서 접근하여 살펴보았다. 즉, 외부 전문가인 보험사가 기업지배구조 차이에 대한 정보를 어떻게 평가하고 있으며 이를 반영하여 차별적인 의사결정을 내리는가를 실증분석하였다. 이를 위해 금융업이 아닌 상장기업들을 대상으로 기업지배구조 정보가 임원배상책임보험료에 미치는 영향을 검증하였다.
  실증분석 결과, 2000년부터 2003년까지 공시된 각 기업의 임원배상책임보험료와 기업지배구조 질의 대용변수 사이에 유의적인 음의 관련성을 발견할 수 있었다. 즉 보험사는 기업지배구조가 우수할수록 임원배상책임보험료를 낮게 산정하고 있음이 검증되었다. 이러한 결과는 보험사와 같은 기업 외부전문가 집단에 의해서 기업지배구조 정보가 활용·반영되고 있음을 의미한다. 또한 외부주주의 대리인 비용을 줄이고 주주의 이익을 보호하기 위하여 경영진과 이사회에게 인센티브(Incentive)를 부여하고 자원을 효율적으로 사용하도록 효과적인 감독기능(Monitoring)을 수행할 수 있는 기업지배구조(내부통제시스템) 구축이, 잠재적인 기업의 소송 위험을 낮출 수 있음을 시사해주고 있다.

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  In the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, Korean corporations have tried to improve transparency by making a better governance structure. In spite of the government’s lead to reform the regimes and each corporations’ endeavor to make a better governance system, the results have not turned out the way that was intended. Large social costs ensued and stakeholders faced heavy losses. Even though a few prior empirical researches attempted to analyze the relation between reformed governance structures and their effectiveness, the results were not promising.
  This paper investigates the effects of reformed governance structures looking from a different viewpoint. It focuses on how outside experts judge each firm’s efforts on governance structure and how much they reflect their judgements on firms when it comes to decision-making. In this paper, we observe insurance companies in particular as one example of outside experts. Therefore, their decision-making will determine the Directors’ and Officers’ Premiums (D&O Premiums) in the way they can maximize their profits. We empirically examine the relationship between governance structures and insurance premiums using data on Korean manufacturing firms. The sample period runs from 2000 to 2003. Insurance companies are one of various specialist groups which evaluate the risk of firms and award a grade to each one of them. In the procedure of the assessment, they have an incentive to consider a firm’s governance quality. Because firms having good governance structures are less exposed to litigation risks, an insurer could mark up low insurance premiums(D&O premiums) to them. Therefore insurance premiums reflect firms’ business risks and governance quality. Consequently, by controlling business risks that firms are facing, we examine whether governance quality is used by insurers.
  We find in this paper that there is a significant negative relationship between D&O insurance premiums and governance quality, which means firms with good corporate governance pay low insurance premiums (managerial ownership, foreign investors ownership and establishment of audit committee are used as a proxy of governance quality).
  The overall results suggest that outside specialist groups such as insurance companies seem to use the information of each firm’s corporate governance structures. It also provides evidence that firms which have good governance structures could lessen their potential litigation risks.

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