* 현재 컨텐츠 정보를 준비 중에 있습니다.

[닫기]

This paper is concerned with to what extent can political representatives exploit their political power to appropriate resources for themselves at the voters' expense. In particular, through analysis of total elections from 13rd(1988) to 17th(2004) showed a distorted representative for local or parties' interest instead of all nations' interest by those elections. The conflict of interest between local voters and rent-seeking political representative is an old theme of the public choice(virginia) school and is perhaps most clearly spelled out in Brennan and Buchanan's(1980) model of the government as a malevolent revenue-maximizing Leviathan.
According to our interpretation of constitutional law, should the congress has been representative for all of nations? An analysis on 13th-17th total elections showed local electoral overcompetition as malfunction against a political democracy and aligned between the politicians' & political parties' interests and voters' interests consistently. we show that no electoral promises could be enforced in their local levels. The political constitution is viewed as an incomplete contract: politicians have complete discretion once in office, and all voters can do is oust them from office at the next elections. The central tension is still between policies and please the voters and rents appropriated by the politicians.
But the role of elections is different from non-verificability, non-observability and non-enforcebility of electoral promises. I discuss two ways in which elections can discipline the incumbent. In the electoral accountability model, citizens vote retrospectively and deliberately punish bad removing misbehaving incumbents from office. In the constitutional customs, bicameral system is superior to unicameral system, we should take a consideration of bicameral system in order to be ready for the south-north korea integration someday.

[닫기]