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Counter-terrorism plus counter-proliferation constitute the primary objectives of U.S. global initiatives after the war on Iraq. Under any circumstances, the United States must prevent terrorists from...
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Counter-terrorism plus counter-proliferation constitute the primary objectives of U.S. global initiatives after the war on Iraq. Under any circumstances, the United States must prevent terrorists from acquiring WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). The new strategic initiative of the United States starts from "military transformation" that has changed the concept of war from the conventional operation to the rapid decisive operation. Geo-strategically, the United States pays keen attention to the Middle East and Central Asia where the U.S.-centered order, once established, is expected to drive the countries toward liberal democracy and the market economy. Central Asia, in particular, has become a bridgehead for the U.S. war on terror since September 11. The U.S. strategy in Central Asia is to prevent Russia from expanding its influence ("Russia Down"); to prevent China from
joining the Great Game ("China Out"); and to push itself (the U.S.) to engage Central Asia ("America In"). In East Asia, on the other hand, the United States tries to maintain its cooperative relationship with China, to make an alliance readjustment with South Korea, and to establish the counter-terror network in Southeast Asia while reinforcing its ties with Japan. Against this back drop, U.S. global initiatives after Iraq are focused upon "the arc of instability" that consists of North Korea, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus region, East Africa, and the Caribbean, where the U.S. forces are required to be ready to quickly respond to the conflict and terror. In this vein, the Bush administration is conducting GPR (Glohal Defense Posture Review) so that U.S. overseas troops may be located closer to those regions and may he come "better, lighter, and faster. " The USFK (U.S. Forces Korea) also plans to relocate and reduce itself under the context of GPR. In light of the U.S. plan to reduce its forces in Korea up to 12,500 by the end of 2005, the South Korean government tries to slow down the pace of reductions until 2008-when the II-billion-dollar upgrading of U.S. fire power to fill the power vacuum is completed. It remains to be seen if the upcoming ROK-U.S. SCM (Security Consultative Meeting) will come up with a compromise on reductions. Under these circumstances, the first thing South Korea needs to do is to expand its strategic vision from the Korean Peninsula to the East Asian region, thereby giving the ROK-U.S. alliance the role of a regional stabilizer. In addition, any transition will necessarily require close cooperation and interoperability between the American and South Korean militaries. Steps could thus be taken to ensure that the South Korean military is kept fully informed of the transformation in U.S. strategy and doctrine. The two countries also should explore means of further defense industrial cooperation and whether the transfer of defense technology can be improved and expanded.
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¥±. »õ·Î¿î ϰßÌÀÇ Ò®é»: Ûíá¦Í£îÜ ÛÁêÛ÷¾á§ Ëþ÷Ð(GPR)
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¥³. ùÛÏÐÀÇ Óûîú°ú Τð¹
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Abstract