* 현재 컨텐츠 정보를 준비 중에 있습니다.

[닫기]

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the sources of bureaucratic inefficiency and some institutional devices to control them. There have been several views about the goal of bureaucratic behavior: neutral producer of public goods, coordinator for socio-economic conflicts, and utility maximizer to seek his own self-interest. Although the first two approaches are partly correct in explaining the goal of bureaucratic behavior, the last one is the most realistic among the views.
Utility-maximizing bureaucrats tend to expand budget size beyond the level of social optimum in producing public goods, which leads to allocative and technical inefficiency. The bureaucratic inefficiency might drive from the asymmetric information about the cost of public goods between bureau and Congress, agenda control by bureaucrats with expert knowledge in producing public goods, and unnecessary regulation to private sector, etc. This paper suggests three institutional devices to control bureaucratic inefficiency. First, ex post control devices consist of severe penalty on bureau's bias, fringe benefits for bureau's good performance, and effective monitoring system, etc. Second, ex ante control devices consist of concealed demand for public goods by Congress, transparency of administrative process and introduction of competitive system for job positions and scarce budget in bureaucratic society, etc.
However, these two devices cost society to control bureaucratic inefficiency and would not be sustained without continuous monitoring. This paper suggests building a society on which trust is the most important factor in all kinds of trade. Social networks based on trust provide right incentive for efficiency to bureaucrats, and induce quasi-voluntary compliance from the citizen. Also, the accumulation of trust in a society will reduce bureaucratic inefficiency, so that leads to increased social welfare.

[닫기]